Abstract. A very simple parallel architecture using a modified version of contentaddressable memory (CAM) can be used to cheaply and efficiently encipher and decipher data with DES-like systems. This paper will describe how to implement DES on these modified content-addressable memories at speeds approaching some of the better Specialized hardware. This implementation is often much more attractive for system designers because the CA!vl can be reprogrammed to encrypt the data with other DES-like systems such as Khufu or perform system tasks like data compression or graphics. The CAM memory architecture is also ehsily extendable to build a large scale engine for exhaustively searching the entire keyspace. This paper estimates that it will be possible to build a machine to test Zs5 keys of DES in one day for $30 million. This design is much less hypothetical than some of the othersin the literature because it is based upon hardware that wdl be available off-the-shelf in the late end of 1992. The architecture of this key search machine is much more attractive to an attacker because it is easily reprogrammable to handle modified DES-like algorithms such a s the UYIX password system or Khufu.
T h e original DES system was designed to be easily implemented in hardware [SBSTT] and the current silicon manifestations of the cipher use modern processor design techniques to encipher and decipher information a t about 1 to 30 megabits per second. Implementations of DES in software for standard CPUs, however, are markedly slower t h a n specialized chips because many of the operations involved in DES are bit-level manipulations. As a result, many of the DES-like systems such as hlerkle's Iihufu [MerSO] were designed as replacements t h a t could be easily implemented on conventional hardware.
There is one class of general architecture, however, t h a t implements bit-level operations. T h e machines like the CM-1, CM-2 and CAI-200 from Thinking Machines Corporation and the Maspar machine all have thousands of one-bit processors. T h e designers intended that a large number of processors would compensate for the deficencies of the individual nodes.
Another example of this small architecture is now emerging from the labs of memory designers who are trying to buiId sophisticated content addressable memory (CAM). T h e individual processors of these machines are even weaker t h a n the ones of the CM-1, hut they can be packed very densely on a chip. The tiny processors have only a fraction of the memory of a CM-1 (42 bits versus thousands) and only a one dimensional interconnection network (vs. 12): but this is sufficient to implement DES. Most importantly, these restrictions allow a packing density (1024 processors per chip) t h a t is significantly higher at a cheap price.
(S30-$100 per chip) Implementing the cipher on generalized parallel architectures like the CAM have one main advantage-cost. Many computer designers often find t h a t the speed of a specialized DES chip is often not worth she price. Generalized, content-addressable machines, however, have many other applications and this makes them a good compromise for the system designer.
T h e design presented here can be easily reprogrammed in software t o encrypt with DES or E.F. Brickell (Ed.): Advances in Cryptology -CRYPT0 '92, LNCS 740, pp. 575-586, 1993 0 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1993 any DES-like variant like Khufu. The hardware can also be used do data compression, data searches or even many different graphics operations. This paper will describe how to implement the DES algorithm on this architecture and produce results that are on par with the middle range of the specialized hardware. The main contribution is not extremely fast encryption speeds. It is very fast speed coupled with software-level flexibility. Many other papers have offered flexible hardware designs [VHVM88, FMP851 that can be easily reworked to handle variants of DES, but none offer the flexibility of this system. Verbauwhede et al. [VHVM88] requires new silicon to be fabricated in all cases and the designs of Falfield et al. [FMP8.5] run internal microcode that can be easily reprogrammed to implement other slight variants of DES such as cipher-block chaining. However, new algorithms like Khufu, however, would require a new micro-code instruction set. The flexibility of this CAM based design is quite attractive to both the system designer and the brute-f0rc.e attacker because it allows the hardware to be used for different purposes and different algorithms.
Content-Addressable Memory Machines
Standard memory maps an address to a value. Unfortunately, there are many applications when an algorithm needs to know which memory location holds a particular value. The only recourse is to search all the memory to find the value in question. Content-addressable memory is a hardware solution to this problem that will invert the search and provide the address holding a value in a single operation. This technique has been well-researched over the years and the book by Kohonen [Koh87] notes many approaches and summarizes some of the more salient aspects of this research. Several companies including AMD are making basic content-addressable memory modules.
MIT and Cornell ( [BriSO, WS89, ZipSU] ) have developed more sophicated and powerful h iplementations in silicon. These implementations allow the programmer to chain the result of several searches together in a simple fashion so that larger data structures and more complicated searches can be performed in hardware. Some of this hardware was originally intended to speed up logic programming, but many people have found surprising and interesting applications for the simple hardware. Oldfield and his team at Syracuse. for instance, are currently working on compressing data.
A company, Coherent Research Incorporated of Syracuse. Yew York, is building sophisticated content-addressable memory chips called the Coherent Processor for widespread use. This paper will use their chip as an example because it is commercia!ly available. but there is n o reason why the algorithms cannot be modified slightly for use on similar chips.
At the basic level, the Coherent Processor is a large, single dimensional array of very simple parallel processors. Each processor has 32 bits of memory (W, [O] denotes the processor number) and three one-bit registers (R,: R2 and R3) . It also has a processing unit that can execute instructions on the registers. transfer data between the registers and the memory, communicate with the two neighboring processors or match a value on the internal bus. The instructions are simple operations that read the three register bits of memory and store the result in one of the three. The match instructions can be used to simultaneously compare one 42-bit value against the entire array of processors. If there is a match, then the appropriate value is placed in a register.
The following The match routine can Include wild-card matches for individual bits so it is possible to match for strings of hits like "OOOD******ll*****~' (a "*" matches both a "0" and a "1''). There are sixteen rounds of encryption and the key scheduling algorithm chooses a 4S-bit subset of key bits to be used on each round. Let fic')[o], . .fdi)[47] be the -IS bits used in round 1. Each block of 64 bits is broken into two 32-bit halves (called BL and BR) and in each round the value of one of the halves is mixed with a subset of the key bits, pased through the s-box and then mixed with the right 32-bit half. MQre precisely, in each round:
CALC:
("@"=XOR) Then BL and BR are exchanged. f is the s-box function that takes 4S bits and returns 32 and the E ( ) function is an "expansion" function that maps 32 bits into 48 bit.s SO it can be combined with the 48 bits of key. Some bits of the input to E are used more than others.
The data to be encrypted is broken into 54-bit blocks and each block is stored in 32-bit halves in two adjacent 42 bit words in the array, W i and !Ti+:.
Permuting the Bits
At the beginning and the end of the encryption process, the 64 bits in the block are passed through a bit-wise permutation. This step is often considered the slowest part of many software implementations for general purpose machines and many people believe that it was included to slow down software implementations and force general CPUs to move bits one by one. The Coherent Processor must also move each bit one a t a time, but at least this is the best that it can do. In practice, the large number of parallel processors makes up for the 
Computing the S-boxes
The s-box are responsible for providing the non-linear mixing of the bits that is necessary LO provide adequate security. At the highest level. the s-box is a function that maps 32 bits t.0 32 other bits. The s-boxes used in DES are! though, much simpler and they can be described as eight functions that take 6 out of the 32 bits and return four. Some bits are used more than others. These eight s-boxes can be further simplified into 32 functions that map six bits to one bit and this is the best level of abstraction to use when programming the Coherent Processor . Meyer and Matyas [MM82] describe t h e design of the s-boxes in terms of minferms, which are roughly the same as clauses of boolean variables. An equation describing output of one bit of an s-box might look something like this: [ l ] .~B i [ j ] .
-B i [ G ] + B 2 [ 2 ] . B , [ 5 ] .
(1) ("."=boolean and, "+"=boolean or: "-"=boolean not.') There are three minterins in che example and it is generally believed that the number of minterms in a minimal expression is one measure the complexity of the s-box. The recent papers by Biham and Shamir [BS91] and others , show that there are additional criterion that are more important. hleyer and hlatyas note that there are 52 and 53 minterms in the description of each of the 8 s-boxes.
These minterm descriptions of the s-boxes can be directly converted into operations for There are 16 rounds in DES, the permutations take 580 cycles and the overall encryption process takes 37,523 cycles.
Handling the Key
When the result of one of the 32 functions is computed it must, be XOR-ed with the key and then passed to the adjacent word to be XOR-ed with the appropriate bit. This method presupposes that the sixteen 48-bit subsets of the keys are precomputed and "compiled" into the code. This process is non-trivial and certain to cost sonie time. When the amount of data encrypted or decrypted per key change is large, then this "compilation" time is minimal. If the key is changed frequently,then there may be some impact on the encryption times. It is not likely to impact the overall throughput, however, if the CPU driving the CAM array is fast enough to interleave operations in between the various CAM instructions. This is not unreasonable because many of t,he CAM instructions take 2 to 4 cycles to complete. A modern pipelined RISC architecture should be able to complete the key scheduling instruction inbetween. A better understanding of the effects of this will need to wait until the software is completely implemented on a working system.
The Total Cost
The current version of the Coherent Processor will run a t speeds up to 50 MHtz. If an encryption takes about 47,428 cycles, then each pair of words in the processor array can encrypt about 1,000 6 4 b i t blocks per second. Writing a word into the array and reading it out takes 5 cycles in total. One chip of the current model has 1024 words or processors, SO it can read in, encrypt and write out blocks of 32K in 52,548 cycles. This is equivalent to 31.2 megabits per second-something that is in line with the middle range of current DES chips-T h e Cryptech CRY12C102 data sheet reports t h a t it runs at 22.5 megabits per second and the Pijnenburg PCClOO attains 20 megabits per second. Moreover, the Coherent Processor is designed to be easily expanded by linking together multiple copies of the chip and n chips will R times faster for small numbers of n. When there are hundreads or thousands of chips, the cost of writing and reading the information from the Coherent Processor hecomes the limiting factor. Coherent Research reports t,hat t h e new chip will cost about $100 per COPY in small quantities and substantially less in large ones.
Exhaustive Attack on DES
When DES was introduced in 1977. some computer scientists protested that 56 bits were not sufficient because it would be possible to do an exhaustive search of the key space in a short amount of time using a massively parallel computer. In their book, Ifeyer and Mat!. = [MM82] discount that possiblity and predict that it would just not be physically possible to build t,he machine until the 1990's because there were too many physical limitations. Heat and power usage are two major barriers. Diffie and Hellman describe the design in detail and respond to these criticism in [DHi?].
How easy xould it be to build one today? Standard off-the-shelf rncryption chips are plentiful and relatively cheap, but they require a second processor feeding t,hem the keys and the test cases. -2nyone who wants to build such a machine must undertake a project of building such a large array of distributed computers. This would require a large amount of custom design work. A truly dedicated attacker could even fabricate custom DES testing chips which have a built in circuit for incrementing the key by one bit and testing the result against another register. Only governments could afford a budget this large. Moreover, t h e slightest change in the algorithm would render this machine worthless.
Garon and Outerbridge calculated the approximate costs of designing such a machine and found that it would cost about 5129,000 for a machine that would break DES within 1 year if the machine was built in 1990. [GOSl] . They also say that a machine that could exhaustively search all the bits in one day for $46 million in 1990. This price would drop to S18 million in 1995. They assume that it is possible to build a node that encrypts 2 million key tests for S25 in 1990 in order to complete such a machine. 'They do riot describe the details of how to design the board or manufacture it is sufficient quanties. T h e Content Addressable klemory array chips, however, are designed to be built into large parallel arrays of chips. It is already possible to buy a board for a PC which has 6.1 chips of a previous model of the Coherent Processor . Large arrays should not be hard to create. Moreover, the algorithm is implemented in software, so the machine can also be used to attack many other subtle and not-so-subtle variations of DES.
W h a t is the best way to do an e-xhaustive search with the current architecture of the Coherent Processor? The version described for simple encryption and decryption is able to work very quickly because it can encode the key in the stream of instructions fed to the Coherent Processor. This approach must be abandoned because an exhaustive search of the key space requires that each processing node must use a different key.
One alternative is to store the key bits in the 10 extra tag bits stored a t each node. Two nodes are used to hold tlie two 32-bit half-blocks of each case, so there are up to 'LO emra key bits which can be stored at each node. Let there be 2" processors in the machine. That means there are 2"-' potential keys that can be tested with each round because two nodes are used for each encryption. Assume that n <_ 21 and the problem does not overflow the physical space of the real machine. (Later versions of the architecture could have more free bits available.) At each pair of nodes, store a unique set of n -1 key bits. These bits will be used by this pair of nodes alone. The other 56 -(n -1) bits are shared by all the instances and they are encoded in the instruction st,ream as before.
.4t the beginning of each round of encryption. the local key bits must be XOR-ed into the appropriate half-block of bits before that half-block is passed through the s-boxes. These four or five instructions will XOR in the key hit I(, in to position Bj:
The SHIFT instruction is only necessary if the key bit is on the opposite node from t h e destination bit. This process is repeated at the end of the s-box calculation to remove t,he bit from the data. Only 48 of the 56 key bite are used at each round. but it is possible that u p to n -1 of these bits will come from the bits stored locally. The operations in equation 1 take 16 cycles. They must be repeatcd 2n -2 times for each round. The result takes 5 l ? n -512 extra cycles for each encryption. If a machine was built with a full complement of 2" processors.
then it would take 37,126 cycles to test 229 potential kevs. This step must be repeated 236 times and the machine is capable of doing about Si'5 of these tests per second or about 76 million per day. Exhausting t,he entire space would require 904 days. If the ivell-known crick of exploiting symmetry in the keys is used to reduce the key space to 2' ' kek-s, then one machine will test all in 452 days.
How much would such a machine cost'? There are 2" processors on a chip that will cost between $30 and SIOO. 211 chips are necessary and this would cost between about 960,000
and %200,000. Control hardware would add additional S10.000 to 1520.000. 45 machines would cost about 53 million dollars and exhaustively search tlie space in 10 days. 530 million would buy a machine that would search the space in 1 day with-450 machines. I'm assuming that volume discounts would apply at this scale and $30 is a price that should apply at the end of 1992 when the chips become widely available. Although this design is still hypothetical, it is much more real than some of the other designs available because the chip fabrication and design is already complete. The process of building a machine out of chips is not much different from connecLing a large bank of memory up to a single processor. This paper does not pretend to address any of the important questions about heat and power dissipation. These could also affect the design and it is possible that my estimate of 910,000 to 820,000 for the SUppGrt hardware is too low.
The standard assumptions about time and transistor density should apply to this model a~ well. It is entirely conceivable that we will see larger improvements in density and price of these machines in the near future because they are younger designs.
The UKIX password system uses a version of DES ohat svt-as presumably modified to make it impossible to gang together a number of off-the-shelf DES chips and use the system to break UNIX passwords. This large machine, however. is not constrained by this modification or any other modification that re-arranges the pattern of s-boxes, permutations and mixing. The salting process used in the UKIX password operation is easy to express with extra bit swapping operations. The only problem with attacking systems like Merkle's Khufu is expressing the sboxes as minterms. Incidentally, logic minimization is also easily handled by the Coherent Processor .
The availability of these systems puts even more pressure on the Unix password system. In 1989, Feldmeier and Karn [FK89] estimated that the UNIX password system was insecure for short alphanumeric passwords because a DEC 3100 could process about 1000 passwords per seconds. Given that each password needs 25 passes of DES, then it is possible to estimate that a Coherent Processor based processor will be able to test about 20,000 passwords per second per chip. If a basic Coherent Processor processor comes with between 8 to 64 chips, then it is easily possible to imagine computers with the ability to test between 160,000 and 1,280,000 tests per second. How fast could such a standard machine test all passwords made up of 6 alphanumeric characters ("A" -"Z" , "a" -"z" , "1" -'9") ? Between about 3.75 days (8 chips) and about half a day (64 chips). A large scale machine with 2 l 1 chips should be able to Gackle passwords with 7 alphanumeric passwords in about one day.
DES with Modified Chaining
The last several sections described how to encrypt a large block of data in parallel using a simple DES with no feedback. The modification adds a great deal of strength to the plain DES because it reduces the redundancies that can developed if there is an 64 bit block that occurs often in the plaintext. The feedback mode ensures that a different value will permute each block and obscure the redundancy. It should be obvious that this system cannot be used when all the blocks are computed in parallel. Here is a modified version of chaining that can be implemented in parallel.
One solution is to exchange and S O R hits with neighbors at the end of certain rounds of encryption. In round 1. the left half of each block is used to compute the value XORed into the right half. After this, the left blocks are exchanged with the neighboring blocks and XOR'ed into the right halves of the neighboring block. This can be done with pseudo-code like this. TV, is the left half and iV,+l is the right half.
This command shifts one bit to the next pair of words over and XOR's it with the value of a neighboring block. It takes 16 cycles per bit to achieve this. This can be repeated as often desired at the cost of slowing down the entire encryption. Doing this at the end of each round of encryption costs 8.132 cycles and this slows the encryption rate to 27.0 megabits per second. In this case: a change in block E, will propigate through blocks Bi t,o Bttl6 and effect their encrypted values. Arbitrarily complex shifting can be included a s long as care is taken to ensure that the results can be reversed. If this step is done often in the process. it can effectively turns the encryption into one large block a t a small decrease in speed.
Conclusion
This paper has described a simple architecture intended for information storage and retrieval that can also encrypt and decrypt messages faster than all hut the best specialized chips.
More importantly, the results are achieved in software so the process can be extended to other DES-like systems without refabricating the chips. The only problem is expressing the s-boxes so they can he implemented with minterms. This should make the chip much more desirable for many implementat,ions of DES that require more flexibility t,han extreme speed.
Chips like the Coherent Processor also make it very easy to create a large-scale processor for exhaustive cryptanalysis of the key space because the chips were designed to be grouped toget,her in a large array. The hypothetical machine described here is much different from die other machines described in the literature because it is both reprogrammable and substantially closer to being realized. Only a minimal amount of logic is necessary to turn the chips into machines that are ible to handle DES and \variants of DES like the U S I X password system or Khufu.
T h e flexible software st.ructure also provides an easy method to test for broken chips. It is possible t o load each line with a test vector, encrypt them in parallel and r.hen test for failures with a MATCH instruction. Many of the earlier designs for large machines needed to build in a specific test function to maintain the system.
There are several changes to t,he Coherent Processor t h a t would improve i t s ability to encrypt DES. Currently. the key is "compiled" into the program for the CA14 and this may be a non-trivial event. If future versions of the architecture have more that 42 bits per rvord.
then it could be practical to store the key locally and add the key in bit by bit as it is done in the brute force attack. Also, the current version of the Coherent Processor will only compute
